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The Anthropocentric Theory Of International Law
As A Basis For Human Rights
by S. Prakash Sinha*
The purpose of Professor Sinha's article is to take notice of human rights activity
and to provide a basis for it in our times in the anthropocentric theory of international
law. He first points out the requirements which a theory justifying human rights must
satisfy, and then examines proposed theories and their inadequacies. Finally, the
author outlines his own anthropocentric theory.
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I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY
E FFORTS TO MAKE the anthropocentric conditions of man'sphysical and moral existence secure from privation by the powerful,
be it an organ of the state or any other dominant segment of the socie-
ty, has produced an agonizing history since the advent of man in socie-
ty. The job, unfinished, continues to occupy men both of ideas and of
action. In recent history the concept of human rights has offered its
own particularity as one means of approaching this struggle. The ideal
of human rights has sometimes found its place in positive law,
although not always with full measure of juridical success.1
Human rights activity has proceeded nationally through municipal
legislation and internationally through treaties. The two approaches
seem to be converging in our times. 2 Most dramatically, the members
of the United Nations joined voices in 1948 in declaring that they shall
"by progressive measures, national and international, . . . secure their
[the human rights] universal and effective recognition and obser-
vance," 3 even though the rights enumerated in the Declaration are as
culturally non-universal as non-distinction on the basis of religion' and
marriage "only with the free and full consent of the intending
(Illinois, 1964); J.S.D. (Illinois, 1966); Barrister-at-Law (Osgoode Hall); Member, Col-
umbia University Peace Seminar. I dedicate this article to John Hazard, the beloved
Chairman of the Peace Seminar.
See, e.g., S.P. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (1971); Sinha,
An Anthropcentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 78 (1971).
2 I am in agreement here with Professor Verzijl in reading the history of human
rights in this way, but I do not believe, as he does, that this has come about "either as
the result of express undertakings to bring the rules of municipal law into harmony
with accepted international standards or simply by the fact of the basic subordination
of municipal to international law." J. VERZIJL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 6 (1958). The reason seems to be not in some axiological pre-eminence of
international law in the contemporary world but rather in an interdependence among
states and an interlocking of their interests to a degree which has not existed in
previous epochs.
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
4 Id. art. 2(1). Islamic law makes a distinction based upon religion for a variety
of legal purposes, although the practice would be unconstitutional in several Muslim
states today. See Ahmed, Islamic Civilization and Human Rights, 12 REVUE IEGYP-
TItNNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1 (1956); M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE
LAW OF ISLAM 175-201 (1955); Mujeeb, Orthodoxy and the Orthodox: The Shariah as
Law, 38 ISLAMIC CULTURE 39 (1964); Nawaz, The Doctrine of 'Jihad" in Islamic Legal
Theory and Practice, 8 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L. AFF 32 (1959); Nawaz, The Concept of
Human Rights in Islamic Law, 11 How. L.J. 325 (1965).
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spouses," as ideologically non-universal as the ownership of private
property, 6 and as politically non-universal as "periodic and genuine
elections."' 7 The Declaration adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly has no legally binding effect,' but the importance of the pro-
clamation of the ideal is not diminished thereby. 9 There has, of
course, been human rights activity preceding this Declaration as well
as subsequent to it.10 Hints for the protection of man can be found in
the Babylonian laws (in the reigns of Urukagina of Lagash, 3260 B.C.,
Sargon of Akkad, 2300 B.C., Ur-Nammu of Ur, 2100 B.C., Lipit-
Ishtar of Isin, 1930 B.C., and Hammurabi of Babylon, 1792-1750
' Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 16(2). Arranged marriages
are the norm in certain societies, e.g., in India.
I Id. art. 17(1). Communist ideology does not admit of private property, except
in consumer goods.
I Id. art. 21(3). Monarchies, dictatorships, single-party rules, and single-
candidate elections are not non-existent.
' See Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 1 (1948). On the question of
whether the practice of states within international organizations creates rules of
customary international law, see Sinha, Identifying a Principle of International Law To-
day,[ 1973] CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 106, 116-120. The Charter of the United Nations, a bind-
ing treaty under international law, contains provisions with respect to human rights, par-
ticularly in the preamble and in articles 55, 56, 76, 13, 62, and 68, but the obligatory
character of these provisions has been a source of controversy, some scholars denying it
(e.g., H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 29 (1950)), some arguing for it
(e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 150 (1950)). For
an assessment of the legal value of these provisions, see Sinha, Has Self-determination
Become a Principle of International Law Today?, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 332, 333-37
(1974); Sinha, Self-determination in International Law and Its Applicability to the
Baltic Peoples, in RES BALTICA 256, 263-65 (A. Sprudzs & A. Rusis eds. 1968).
9 Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 354 (1948).
10 For a history of human rights, see F. VAN ASBECK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1949); Z. CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1951); CH. DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITfS EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 158-65 (1955); J. VERZIJL, supra note 2; Rommen, Vers
l'internationalization des droits de l'homme, 1 JUSTICE DANS LE MONDE 163 (1959);
Hamburger, Droits de l'homme et relations internationales, 97 RECUEIL DES COURS 293,
303 (1959); Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Quelques problemes de la mise en ouvre de la
ddclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, 83 RECUEIL DES COURS 255, 268 (1953);
Premier, Introduction to A. VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARA-
TION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (n.d., possibly 1964); P. DROST, HUMAN
RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS ch. 1 (1951); H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD (1972); Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle
Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER
ESSAYS 75 (M. Bos ed. 1973).
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B.C.)" as well as in the Assyrian laws (those inscribed on the nine clay
tablets in the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, 1115-1077 B.C.)' 2 and in the
Hittite laws (especially those ascribed to the reign of King Telepinus,
1511-1486 B.C.)." The Dharma of ancient India (Vedic Period: 1500
B.C. - 500 B.C.), 14 and the jurisprudence of Lao-Tsze (b. 604 B.C.)"
and Confucius (550 or 551 B.C. - 478 B.C.)1 6 in ancient China con-
tained laws for the protection of human rights. Citizens of the city-
states of ancient Greece enjoyed isogoria (equal freedom of speech),
isonomia (equality before the law), jus sufragii (the right to vote), jus
honorum (the right to be elected to public office), jus comercii (the
right to trade), and jus actionis (the right of access to justice). The
Roman Law provided similar rights to the Romans under jus civile,
and even extended certain rights to non-Romans under jus gentium.
In recent times, the significant landmarks in the protection of
human rights include the Great Charter of the Liberties of England or
the Magna Carta (1215),'" Statutem de tallagio non concedendo
(1297)," the Petition of Rights (1628)," the Instrument of Government
(1653),20 the Habeas Corpus Act (1679),2' the Bill of Rights (1689),22
" For a collection of these laws, see G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN
LAWS (rev. ed. 1968).
'2 For a collection of these laws, see G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE ASSYRIAN LAWS
(1935).
11 For a collection of these laws, see E. NEUFELD, THE HITTITE LAWS (1951)..
14 A. BASHAM, THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA (3d rev. ed. 1968); 1 P. KANE,
HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL LAW (2d
ed. 1968); INSTITUTES OF HINDU LAW; OR, THE ORDINANCES OF MANU (W. Jones
trans. 1869).
11 A. WALEY, THE WAY AND ITS POWER, A STUDY OF THE TAO TE CHING
(1934).
16 THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS (A. Waley trans. 1938).
11 Lacking money, King John had been forced to cede his kingdom to the Pope
in 1213 and to receive it back as a fief. Thereafter he was defeated by the King of
France near Bouvines in 1214 and this charter was imposed on him by the prelates,
earls, and barons of his realm on the meadows of Runnymede near Staines (Surrey).
1s Edward I gave this statute to the English people. He also convoked represent-
atives of towns and counties to the Parliament.
19 Parliament presented this petition to Charles I, who sanctioned it on 7 June
1628. The King was subsequently tried and beheaded.
20 This instrument gave supreme authority to Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector
of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
2 Enacted by Charles II on 26 May 1679, this was officially titled An Act for the
Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for Prevention of Imprisonment
Beyond the Seas.
2 Officially titled An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject,
and for Settling the Succession of the Crown, this was enacted 16 December 1689 on
[Vol. 10:469
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the Declaration of Rights, Virginia (12 June 1776),23 the Declaration of
Independence of the Thirteen United States of America (4 July 1776),
the Constitution of the United States (17 September 1787) with
Amendments of 1789, 1865, 1869, and 1919, and the Diclaration des
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (26 August 1789).24 Human rights
provisions have since this Diclaration been included in the constitu-
tions adopted in Western Europe, 25 Eastern Europe,26 the Soviet
Union, 27 Asia,28 and other parts of the world.
On the plane of international law, the Treaty of Augsburg (1555)
among the Christian European states provided for the freedom of
religion. The treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden
under the Peace Settlement of Westphalia (1648) guaranteed some
religious freedom to Christian creeds. The Treaty of Oliva (1660) be-
tween Sweden, Poland, and Russia and the Treaties of Nymegen
(1678) and Ryswyck (1697) between France and Holland protected
religious freedom in the ceded territories. The Treaty of Kutchuk
Kainardji (1774) between Turkey and Russia protected Christian
minorities in Turkey. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (9 June
1815) recognized minority rights for the Polish population in various
countries. The Act on the Federal Constitution of Germany (signed on
8 June 1815 and annexed to the First Act) protected the religious and
civil rights of Jews in the new German Federation. The Treaty of Vien-
na (31 May 1815) among the Netherlands, England, Russia, Austria,
and Prussia provided similar protection in the union between Belgium
the occasion of the accession to the throne of William of Orange and Mary Stuart
after the fall of James II.
2 This declaration was preceded by the Plantation Covenants, such as the Fun-
damental Orders of Connecticut (1638), but these granted no human rights other than
freedom of religion.
24 Lafayette, who had supported the cause of the American colonies for in-
dependence, introduced this declaration in the French Assembli'e Constituante in July
1789.
25 For example, the Belgian Constitution of 1831, the French Constitution of
1946, and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949. See J. VER-
ZIJL, supra note 2, at 59-71.
26 For example, the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1960,
and the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Peselj, Re-
cent Codification of Human Rights in Socialist Constitutions, 11 How. L.J. 342
(1965).
27 See Berman, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 11 HOw. L.J. 333 (1965).
28 For example, India. See George, Human Rights in India, 11 HOW. L.J. 291
(1965).
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
and Holland. The Treaty of Paris (1856) provided certain protection
to the populations of Walachia, Moldavia, and Serbia following the
Crimean War. The Geneva Convention (1864) provided for the relief
of sick and wounded soldiers and prisoners of war. The Treaty of
Berlin (1878) provided for freedom of religion and juridical equality.
The General Act of the Berlin Conference on Central Africa (1885)
forbade slave trade, and the Brussels Conference (1889) agreed on
measures to suppress it. The Treaty of Paris (1889) ceding Puerto Rico
and the Philippines from Spain to the United States provided for the
protection of minorities. The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) pro-
vided for the protection of the wounded, prisoners, and civil popula-
tions in war. The Second Berne Conference (1906) opened for
signature the International Convention Respecting the Prohibition of
Night Work for Women in Industrial Employment and the Interna-
tional Convention Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of White
(Yellow) Phosphorus in the Manufacture of Matches. The Polish
Minorities Treaty, signed along with the German Peace Treaty at Ver-
sailles (1919), the Minorities Treaties signed by Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece (1919 and 1920), and the Peace
Treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly, and Trianon (1919) and of Lausanne
(1923), provided for the protection of minorities. The General Conven-
tion of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland (1922) went so far
as to grant individual members of a protected minority the right to
petition an international organ. The Covenant of the League of Na-
tions (1919) contained provisions protecting the rights of inhabitants of
the colonies and territories under the control of the member states. 9
The Mandates System of the League, substituted by the trusteeship
system of the United Nations, provided for the protection of certain
racial, religious, and linguistic minorities. The International Labor
Organization also has adopted various labor conventions. The Charter
of the United Nations (1945) contains human rights provisions.3 0 Cer-
tain of its organs, namely, the General Assembly, the International
Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social
Council, along with the Commission on Human Rights3' (which the
29 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONVENANT arts. 1(3), 13(1), 55(a)(c), 59,61 (1)(2), 68,
76(c).
30 U.N. CHARTER arts. 22 and 23.
Originally, this Commission was to have three subcommissions: one on
freedom of information and the press, one on the prevention of discrimination and the
protection of minorities, and one on the status of women. The Subcommission on the
Status of Women soon became a full commission reporting directly to the Economic
[Vol. 10:469
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Council created by virture of Article 68 of the Charter), and the
Security Council are concerned with human rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948. The Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights were opened for signature in 1966, and have come into
force only recently.
There are also many multilateral treaties dealing with specific
rights and groups of rights which are in force. 32 Regionally, the Euro-
pean Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertms
fondamentales (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms) was adopted in 1950, creating by virtue of
Article 19 the European Commission of Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. The American Convention on Human
Rights was approved in 1969, although it has not yet entered into
force. The Arab League created a Permanent Arab Commission on
Human Rights in 1968. There have been proposals for the creation of
an African Commission on Human Rights. There is a human rights
provision in the Helsinki Agreement (1975) between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Thus, human rights activity has been a concern
of states on both national and international planes.
The human rights movement is in need of a theory which would
provide it with an adequate basis of support. In order to provide this
support, that theory must satisfy certain requirements.
II REQUIREMENTS OF AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
An adequate theory must furnish a compelling justification for
human rights. It must provide a principle for both the protection of
the individual and the positive fulfillment of his needs. The theory
must account for the historicity of these rights, and must enable an
order of priority to operate upon any catalog of such rights. It must
allow for revision of these rights. It must accommodate cultural and
ideological relativity. And, finally, it must accommodate the variables
of economic capacity and technological capability.
and Social Council. The Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press
was terminated in 1951. Only the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities survives.
32 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I (1973).
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A. Compelling Justification
The theory must provide a justification for human rights which is
compelling. It is not enough to ground these rights in exhortations.
Nor is it enough to ground them in condemnations for failure to
achieve them. Rather, a basis must be sought that points up the
necessity for realizing these rights.
B. Protection of the Individual as Well as Fulfillment of His Needs
Since its inception, the notion of human rights has grown from
providing protection to the individual from the excesses of the organs
of the state to providing positive conditions for the fulfillment of his
needs and the realization of his personality. The juridical recognition
of human rights in both these aspects is necessary in order to furnish a
principle of legitimization: in the first aspect, to secure recognition
from the state of the individual's security against its power and to pro-
vide institutional machinery to effectuate that security; in the second
aspect, to formulate demands toward realization of his values and to
mobilize the state's resources and to harness its institutional machinery
toward fulfillment of those demands. Juridicalization of human rights
is necessary because without it, the citizen merely would be appealing
to moral principles and public opinion while seeking protection from
the state against the excesses of state power, rather than invoking a
common reference between him and the state. Similarly, while seeking
fulfillment of his needs from the state, he would be using terms which
are non-reciprocal and irrelevant since there would be no common
reference to invoke. It would, of course, be naive to conclude from this
that the juridicalization of human rights would eliminate the conflict
between the citizen and the state or that the conflict would cease to
have purpose. The conflict, however, would now be located in a
juridically cognizable field. An adequate theory of human rights must
clarify this field in both the above-mentioned aspects.
C*. Historicity
From an anthropocentric point of view, human rights are fun-
damental in nature and ontological in character. They are fundamen-
tal because they are essential to man's fulfillment as a social being.
They are ontological in character because they have an essential struc-
ture. They relate to man in his historicity, upon the conception that
the essential structure of man is not that which transcends subjection
to time, but rather that -which gives him historicity, makes his advent
[Vol. 10:469
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in the world historical, views him not as a passive incident in the un-
folding of his transhistoric impersonal essence but as a personal being
whose active dynamism makes history. Both the positivist philosophy of
law and the traditional natural law philosophy fail to take. account of
this relationship between the historicity of man and his human rights.
Legal positivism reduces law to a matter of commands," rules, 4 or
norms.3 It thereby puts the problem outside the historical context.
And, since the positivist system is self-sufficient, as a model of com-
mands, rules, or norms, there is no room in it for the fundamental
rights of man.3 6 The traditional doctrine of natural law gives a per-
manently valid formulation to the essential structure of man and sets
up permanently valid standards of human conduct. Thus, the doctrine
fails to take into account the historicity of man or the historical
character of his nature. An adequate theory of human rights must not
ignore the historicity of man.
D. Order of Priority
Human needs are various. Moreover, they are experienced with
varying intensity. Since these needs make a claim on the resources of
the state, both material and institutional, and since it is in the nature
of resources that they are available only in finitude at a particular
point in time, fulfillment of these needs has to be approached with an
order of priority. Human rights, which represent these needs in both
of their aspects discussed above, correspondingly must be based upon a
theory which allows for an order of priority to operate upon any
catalog of such rights.
E. Revisability
Not only must the theory provide for the order of priority among
various human rights, it must also enable the revisability of such rights
33 J. AUSTIN (1790-1859), THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, AND
THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE; WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY H.L.A. HART
1-2, 9-33, 37-38, 42-43, 59, 193-95, 202-05 (1968).
34 H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1967).
11 H. KELSEN (1881-1973), GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 3-6, 15-49,
110-23 (A. Wedberg trans. 1949).
"6 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958). Comparable conclusions can be derived from the earlier positivist
philosophies of law: Kautilya (India, 4th century B.C.) in THE KAUTILiYA'S ARTHA-
SASTRA, pt. II, 6-12 (P. Kangle trans. 1963); Shang Iang (China, d. 338 B.C.), in J.
WU, JURIDICAL ESSAYS AND STUDIES 216-18 (1928); Shuen Tao (China, contemporary
of Shang Zang), id. at 218.
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in consonance with either a shift in needs or an emergence of new
needs in the historic experience of man. For, epistemologically, our
concepts gain meaning only in the context of human knowledge37 and
since the context changes, our specific concepts of human rights must
be allowed to be revised and thus be enriched by the changed context.3 8
For example, protection of privacy did not figure in the catalog of
human rights contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Today, however, it has acquired significant meaning in the
context of sophisticated technology which the state has since acquired
to invade the privacy of the individual and the use to which this
technology has been put, so that privacy figures prominently in the
current discussion of human rights.
F. Cultural Relativity
Originally, the word "culture," derived from the Latin cultura,
meaning cultivating the soil, meant cultivation of the mind. Between
the late eighteenth and the late nineteenth centuries the concept of
culture developed in European thought to mean either a general state
or habit of the mind related to the idea of perfection, or a general
state of intellectual and moral development in a society as a whole, or
the general body of the arts and intellectual work, or finally, the whole
way of life (material, intellectual, and spiritual) of a given society.
This, in part, was a result of the growing knowledge by the Europeans
of the non-European civilizations of India, Persia, and China which,
although dismissed by many Europeans as backward societies, were
regarded by some as distinctive shapings of the human mind which
could not be comprehended in any unilinear concept of civilzation.
The consequent intellectual tension produced three different meanings
of culture: 1) culture as denoting a process that should be a universal
idea in an embodiment of universal and absolute values; 2) culture as
indicating the different ways in which men find meaning and value in
their lives and conceive of their notion of perfection; and 3) culture as
pointing to a body of actual artistic and intellectual work. 39
A. RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (1967).
s As Machan says, "[W]e must get away from the idea that only that will count
as a viable and defensible notion of something which gives us a timeless snapshot pic-
ture of it which cannot ever be revised." Machan, A Rationale for Human Rights, 52
PERSONALIST 216, 225 (1971).
31See in this connection, M. ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY (1869); D.
BIDNEY, THEORETICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1953); T.S. ELIOT, NOTES TOWARDS THE
DEFINITION OF CULTURE (1949); A. KROEBER, THE NATURE OF CULTURE (1952); A.
[Vol. 10:469
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There are irreconcilable differences in viewing culture as an em-
bodiment of universal and absolute values, in viewing it as a social
concept, and in viewing it as an artistic and intellectual classification.
Since these differences represent important differences in viewpoint
and belief, one cannot pick one concept as the proper meaning of
culture and condemn the rest without being dogmatic. A human rights
enthusiast, and I count myself as one, might opt for the idealist con-
cept of culture (that culture is a universal idea embodying universal
and absolute values), although this concept is commonly associated
with the classical and Christian heritage of Europe, and might propose
a concept of universal human culture with absolute and universal
human rights of the sort for which he has a humanistic preference. An
adequate theory of human rights must, however, avoid that dogmatism
and must take sufficient account of the cultural relativity of men living in
different cultural systems. This does not at all mean that people living in
different cultures now fall beyond the scope of our concern for human
rights, thereby nullifying the international aspect of the human rights
movement. On the contrary, all people continue to be the subject of what
Edmund Cahn so elegantly described as the sense of injustice in an in-
disociable blend of reason and empathy.4 0 What it does mean is that an
American, who is accustomed to marriage between consenting spouses,
cannot, without being dogmatic, insist upon the abolition of arranged
marriages, in the village of Daryabad in India, for example; this is
especially so when the record of his own culture is just about as unsuc-
cessful as that of Daryabad in achieving marital bliss by reason of the par-
ticular way of getting espoused.4 1 A sound theory of human rights must
accommodate cultural relativity, not ignore it.4Z
KROEBER & C. KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINI-
TIONS (1952); R. MACIVER, SOCIETY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CHANGES (1931); R.
WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1958).
40 E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE, AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW
22-27 (1949).
41 Cf. Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
42 1 am here not endorsing Adda Bozeman's thesis that cultural differences
among the West, the Islamic Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, India and In-
dianized Asia, and China would frustrate international law, that "[i]n an epoch . . . in
which national and international politics are governed by ideology, law must be ex-
pected to recede from the fields of consciousness and perception, all the more so as it
had never been developed as a set of separate normative and symbolic references in
traditional Asian and African societies." A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A
MULTICULTURAL WORLD, 183 (1971). As I see it, the interests which join the states in
the field of international law in general are not culturally particularized, e.g., deter-
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G. Ideological Relativity
Destutt de Tracy was not the first person to use the concept of
ideology, but when he coined the word id~ologie in 1796 he had hoped
that his science of ideas would lead to institutional reforms in France,
as Bentham's ideas (1748-1832) had done in England. The idologistes
had a measure of success in the Deuxi~me Classe (moral and political
sciences of the Institut National) until Napoleon Bonaparte abolished
the Deuxi~me Classe in 1802-1803, ridiculing the idcologues as im-
practical visionaries.4 3 Karl Marx (1818-1883) adopted the Napoleonic
contempt of ideology and used the term to signify a false consciousness
of social and economic realities. He regarded it as a collective illusion
shared by the members of a given social class and distinctively
associated with that class in history. 44 Karl Mannheim even inflated it
into an all-embraching doctrine of historical and cultural relativism. 41
In current usage, ideology denotes beliefs and ideas which commit
their adherents to actions,46 a body of ideas accepted by individuals or
peoples. 47 It has connotations of emotional and intellectual commit-
ment, of action orientation, and of conscious or unconscious marshal-
ling of facts to fit a preestablished doctrine. It furnishes its adherents
with a self-definition, as well as a set of deducible imperatives. An
mination and protection of territories, jurisdiction, international agreements, interna-
tional claims, diplomatic intercourse, regulation of activities in the sea, use of force,
and so on. However, in the area of human rights the very matter of concern is the
treatment of the individual in the particular society where he lives and, therefore, par-
ticularized cultural considerations become quite relevant. Although I do not believe, as
she does, that "[p]resent efforts aiming at an extension of international law to the
sphere of individual life by drafting, for example, universally valid covenants of
human rights, appear in this perspective to be exercises in futility.....," id., I do
believe that cultural relativity does offer a challenge to any theory of human rights on
the international plane.
4' See F. PICAVET, LES IDPOLOGUES (1891).
44 Marx's theory of ideology is' found in K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN
IDEOLOGY (written 1845-1846; published 1932). See also Marx's preface to A CON-
TRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1859); F. ENGELS, LUDWIG
FEUERBACH AND THE'OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY esp. chs. 3 and 4
(1888).
45 K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936). See Mannheim's criticism in K.
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES ch. 23 (5th ed. rev. 1966).
46 See S.P. SINHA, NEW NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 3: Ideological
Perspectives of the Asian and African States 53, esp. n.1 (1967).
' Aron, The Diffusion of Ideologies, in POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE WORLD
WAR II 4 (W.' Stankiewicz ed. 1964).
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adequate theory of human rights must accommodate the ideological
relativity.
The correct model is not that human rights be grounded in an
ideological homogeneity that would bridge the gap between the con-
flicting ideologies, 48 but that they be realized within the ideological
pluralism. Take, for anaylsis, communist ideology, with all its varia-
tions, and Western democracy, with all its variations. The two systems
fulfill the human needs of their adherents in two fundamentally dif-
ferent ways. For example, one proceeds on the basis of acceptance of
private property in the productive apparatus of the economy, the other
on the basis of state ownership of this apparatus. A theory of human
rights cannot force the private property of the former upon the
economic ideology of the latter as a fundamental human right without
being dogmatic. It must not force one ideology upon the other. 49
Rather, it must strive for the minimization of injustice to the in-
dividuals within the conceptual framework of their respective
ideological models. Nor can that theory validly proceed upon the
presumption' that one ideology or the other is totally inconsistent with
the demands of human rights.5 0
48 Professor Murphy suggests this model. Murphy, Ideological Interpretations of
Human Rights, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 286 (1971-72). For a different approach, see
Vasak, Le droit international des droits de l'homme, 140 RECUEIL DES cOURS 332, 404
(1974). See, in this connection, LE DROIT D'1TRE UN HOMME, Unesco (1968) (prepared
under the direction of J. Hersch).
49 Cf Article 17(1) of the Universal Declaration, supra note 3,: "Everyone has
the right to own property alone as well as in association with others."
10 As Professor Berman points out,
[t]he striking fact is that in the protection of human rights, the Soviet system
is strong where ours is weak, just as it is weak where ours is strong. There is a
very high degree of job security in the Soviet Union. Medical services are
freely available to all. Higher education is also freely available to all, on the
basis of entrance examinations- indeed, students at higher educational in-
stitutions receive stipends from the State. Legal services are inexpensive, and
court procedure is speedy. There is a high degree of equality in the treatment
of the many different ethnic groups that make up the Soviet Union. Under
the 1960 Criminal Code of the Russian Republic (the largest of the 15
republics that make up the Soviet Union), making statements in order to
arouse racial hostility or dissension, or directly or indirectly restricting the
rights of citizens on the ground of race is punishable by deprivation of
freedom for a term of six months to three years or by deportation for a term
of two to five years (Article 74). There is also a high degree of equality be-
tween men and women. Women receive equal pay with men for equal work,
and they comprise a substantial percentage of all the major professions
(including about one-third of the legal profession and about three-fourths of
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H. Economic Relativity
Human rights, in the two aspects discussed earlier, make demands
upon the economic and institutional resources of the state. Since states
vary in their economic capacity and technological capability, a theory
of human rights must take into account this economic relativity.
So far we have examined the requirements which an adequate
theory of human rights must fulfill. Now we shall examine the theories
advanced to support human rights.
III. THE THEORIES
Human rights primarily have been justified on the basis of natural
law, the being of man as man, the equality of man, and social utility.
A. Natural Law
Natural law theories are various. They may be classified as follows:
1. The early perceptions of natural law:
(a) Natural law as law of virtue:
(i) Dharma (India, Vedic Period: 1500 B.C. -
500 B.C.). 5s
(ii) Lao-Tsze (China, b.604 B.C.).5 2
(iii) Confucius (China, b.550 or 551 B.C. - 478 B.C.)"3
(b) Natural law as justice by nature: Aristotle (Greece,
385 or 384 B.C. - 322 B.C.).5 4
the medical profession); the 1960 Criminal Code makes it a punishable of-
fense to violate a woman's equal rights by force or threat of force (Article
134). Finally, I would stress that although legal protection against abuses of
human rights by the central authorities is extremely weak under the Soviet
system, since the central leadership has complete de facto control over the
legislature, there is nevertheless a quite effective system of protection against
abuses of human rights by legal authorities where such abuses are in violation
of the centrally determined law and policy.
Berman, supra note 27, at 334-35. It is also true, as Professor Berman has himself
pointed out, that there is "an autocratic central authority that has often been ruthless
in crushing human rights," which has, nevertheless, "established an effective system of
control over abuses of human rights by intermediate administrative officials." Id. at
339-40. This apparent paradox is explained by Professor Berman in terms of a paren-
tal concept of law that characterizes the Soviet legal system.
11 See sources cited in note 14 supra.
'2 See A. WALEY, supra note 15.
11 See ANALECTS, supra note 16.
14 ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA (W. Ross trans.) Book V, 1129b, 1132a,
1134b, 1135a, 1137b, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (1969).
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(c) Natural law as law of right reason: Cicero (Rome,
106 B.C. - 43 B.C.). 55
(d) Natural law as law of God: Aquinas (1225-1274).56
2. The modern perceptions of natural law:
(a) Natural law as objectively given (donnt) value: G(ny
(1861-1944).r"
(b) Natural law as morals: Dabin (b.1889).58
(c) Natural law as deontology: d'Entr~ves (b.1902). 59
(d) Natural law related to sociology: Selznick (b.1919). 60
(e) Natural law based on anthropology: Mead (b.1901); 61
Edel (b.1909) and Edel (b.1908). 62
(f) Natural law as ethical jurisprudence: Cohen
(1880-1947).63
(g) Natural law as a relationship between moral truths and
general facts: Brown (b.1916).64
(h) Natural law as relativity of rights and restraints: Chroust
(b. 1907). 65
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA; DE LEGIBUS, De Re Publica, Book
II1, XXII, 211; De Re Legibus, Book I, V, 315-17, VI, 317-19, XV, 343-45, XVI,
345-47, XVIII, 349-51; Book II, IV, 379-83, V, 383-87 (C. Keyes trans. 1952).
66 8 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II (First Part), Third
Number, Questions XC, XCI, XCIV (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans. 1942).
11 F. GNY, MkTHODE D'INTERPRf:TATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVf: POSITIF
365-75, XXI-XXXIII (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., nos. 160-62, 2d ed. 1963).
58 Dabin, Thoorie gonfrale du droit (1944) (trans. as General Theory of Law by
K. Wilk), in 4 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF
LASK, RADBRUCH AND DABIN 234, 232-336, 416-18, 419-21, 422-31 (1950).
59 A. d'Entreves, The Case for Natural Law Re-examined, 1 NATURAL L.F. 5,
28-49 (1956).
60 Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL L.F. 84, 99-108 (1961).
61 Mead, Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law, 6
NATURAL L.F. 51, 51-54, 64 (1961).
62 M. EDEL & A. EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS 19-33, 77-85, 130-31,
231-32 (rev. ed. 1968).
63 M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 401-29, 446-49 (1953); and LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER (1933).
64 Brown, Huntsmen, What Quarry?, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, A SYMPOSIUM
177, 179-85 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
61 Chroust, Natural Law and Legal Positivism, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 178, 178-86
(1952).
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(i) Natural law as the inner morality of law: Fuller
(b. 1902).66
(j) Natural law as a sense of injustice: Cihn (1906-1964).7
(k) Natural law as objective juridical values: Recas~ns-Siches
(b. 1903).68
Human rights theories have, for the most part, used the classical
absolutist conception of natural law to justify these rights, 69 although a
relativist position is emerging among some. recent justifications of
human rights.70 The classical formulations of natural law harnessed for
this purpose have included the legal philosophies of the Greeks (e.g.,
Aristotle), the Stoics (e.g., Cicero), and the Christian theologians (e.g.,
Aquinas). Aristotle taught that there really is a natural justice that is
binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant
with each other. Cicero argued that true law is right reason in agree-
ment with nature, which is universally applicable, unchanging, and
everlasting, which can not be repealed, or abolished, which is valid for
all nations and all times, and from whose obligations we cannot be
freed by senate or people. God, he declared, is the author of this law,
its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Aquinas showed that natural
law derived from the law of God. He argued that since..the world is
ruled -by divine providence, the entire community of the universe is
governed by divine reason. The whole of divine law is not accessible to
man. The intelligible part. reveals itself through eternal law, which in-
corporates divine wisdom. Natural law is that part of divine law which
reveals itself in natural reason. Human law is derived from the prin-
ciples of eternal law as revealed in natural law. God's eternal reason
finds its written exposition in divine laws (in the. Christian scriptures)
61 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-6, 9-13, 38-44, 96-97, 184-86 (1969).-
61 E. CAHN, supra note 40, at 1-2, 11-14, 22-27.
61 Recas~ns Siches, Human Life, Society and Law: Fundamentals of the
Philosophy of the Law (G. Ireland trans.), in 3 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
SERIES: LATIN-AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 18-27, 38-39, 118-24, 319-21 (1948).
19 E.g., J. LOCKE (1632-1704), A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), and
Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (1690). Locke's theory of natural rights has been
adopted in various historical documents concerning human rights, e.g., Bill of Rights
(1689),. Declaration of Rights (Virginia 1776), Declaration of Independence (U.S.
1776), Dsclaration des droits de l'homme et du Citoyen (1789).
70 E.g., Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights, .1 REVUE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 14 (1968) Cf Machan, Human Rights: Some Points of Clarification, 5 J.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30" (1975); and Machan, supra note 38. See also Rimanque
Human Rights, 7 WORLD JUSTICE 170, 190 ff. (1965-66).
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and unwritten exposition in natural law. It is a characteristic feature
of classical natural law theory that certain norms for human conduct
are right regardless of whether they coincide with positive law, that
they are right even for those who do not accept them, and that they
are not scientifically verifiable, so that they derive either from religious
articles of faith or from primary postulates of reason.
The use of natural law theory is unsatisfactory for thinking about
the norms of human conduct for several reasons:
(1) There is an arbitrariness in a theory which insulates
itself against the possibility of verification and makes itself.
unavailable to being disproved, thereby exempting itself from.
rational argumentation. Its source is God, or absolute reason,
or some other comparable metaphysics.
(2) The theory is predicated upon a belief in either the
innermost being of man and things or even outright belief in'
God. Such beliefs are not as generally held as their adherents
would like to believe. It is instructive, to note that in the
deliberations that accompanied • the drafting of the Universal
Declaration of Human- Rights, the proposals to put' human
rights-under the protection of the Divinity or even to affirm the
divine origin of man were rejected."
71 At the second session of the Human Rights Commission, Lebanon proposed,
in connection with the article dealing with the family, the inclusion of language stating
that these rights were granted by the Creator. It was inspired to do so by the Human
Rights Declaration of the National Catholic Welfare Conference of America. It argued
that the family was a creation of God and that He granted it certain inalienable
rights. However, the Soviet Union argued against this inclusion, pointing out that dif-
ferent forms of marriage and family life exist in the world, corresponding to the par-
ticular economic conditions of different peoples, that different religions have different
ideas as to the place of woman in the family, and that much of the world does not
believe in God, whereas the. Declaration was meant for all humanity. Chile, China, In-
dia, Lebanon, Panama, and the Philippines voted for the Lebanese proposal.
Belgium, Byelorussia, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Ukraine,
the U.S.S.R., Uruguay, and Yugoslavia voted against it. Australia, Egypt, and Iran
abstained.
At the second session of the Drafting Committee, Lebanon again made its pitch,
arguing that the proposal did not offend the doctrine of separation of church and state
(as had been argued by Uruguay at the session mentioned above), and that the
Creator is not necessarily God, since it could be Nature under certain philosophies.
The Soviet Union questioned the wisdom of introducing philosophical' elements in the
Declaration. The United Kingdom expressed sympathy for the Lebanese viewpoint,
but suggested that Lebanon offer its amendment in the first articles of the Declaration
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(3) Since a natural right is discovered by insight, intui-
tion, or evident contemplation, so that there is no criterion of
truth other than faith, it is necessarily subject to any inter-
pretation that insight, intuition, or evident contemplation
might prompt. For example, nature and God have as much
justified slavery in Plato, Aristotle, or the Southern States of
America as they have justified equality in Sophistes or
Rousseau; they have as much justified Hobbes' absolute power
as Rousseau's absolute democracy; they have as much justified
which embodied some philosophical considerations. The amendment was rejected. See
U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR 37, at 13-15 (1948); CN.4/AC.1/SR 38, at 7-9 (1948).
In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, Brazil proposed an amend-
ment to Article I (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/215 (1948)) stating that man was created in the
image and likeness of God and only thus was he granted reason and conscience.
Belgium pointed out the delicate nature of this amendment and suggested that even
the words "by nature" ought to be dropped from the original text. Cuba agreed, sug-
gesting that the issue was not whether nature or God is the source of reason and con-
science. China approved of the deletion of "by nature" in order to avoid resolving a
theological question which had no place in a Declaration intended for universal ap-
plication. Uruguay argued that the relations among men are determined not only by
juridical norms but also by the principles of social and moral order, and that as to the
latter a common denominator for the entire world has not yet been found. Argentina
supported the Brazilian amendment, arguing that it is a common belief in all nations
that man was created in the image and likeness of God, that there is no opposition
between religion and politics, and that religion gives man the inspiration to follow the
ways of peace. The U.S.S.R. warned that an attempt to impose one nation's faith on
others would amount to a return to the era of the crusades, that the Declaration must
not contain theological affirmations, given the separation of church and state in
numerous countries, and that the Declaration must not resolve questions meant to be
resolved by each individual for himself, which indeed is one of the rights granted by
the Declaration in the form of the freedom of conscience. Colombia argued that the
separation of church and state is not inconsistent with the meaning of God. Bolivia
argued that God is a positive reality, not a subject of discussion. The United Kingdom
and India suggested withdrawal of the Brazilian amendment, since it made a declara-
tion of faith not accepted by all. France, too, suggested the withdrawal of the amend-
ment, arguing that it is best not to settle the question of the origins of man but to ar-
rive at fundamental principles which could be put into practice by both believers and
non-believers. The Netherlands made the same suggestion of withdrawal in light of the
difficulties raised by the amendment. Finally, Brazil withdrew its amendment. Pro-
ceedings of the Third Committee, 90-126, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR 95-100 (1948).
The Netherlands offered an amendment to the preamble to the effect that equal
and inalienable rights are based on the divine origin and immortal destiny of man,
arguing that this would give satisfaction to the majority of the world's population and,
while it would be devoid of sense for non-believers, it would not hurt them. Poland
argued that it is extremely dangerous to make the Declaration only partially ap-
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the establishment (Aquinas) as the revolution (Rousseau).72
One might explain, as did Aquinas, that reason can be led
astray by passion. But then we come back to the problem of
how to decide whether Aristotle's justification of slavery was an
example of reason, or an example of reason led astray by pas-
sion. Faith cannot be a justification of its own self, unless one
believes that faith is indeed a justification of itself.
(4) There is something intellectually disturbing, although
psychically comforting, in accepting a natural right just
because God meant it to be so or because right reason revealed
it to be so in nature in an a priori fashion, without scrutinizing
the pretended claim. One might question whether, for exam-
ple, it fulfills the individual's needs under his circumstances,
whether it contributes to attainment of justice in his setting, or
whether it is even relevant to the circumstances of his living.
(5) There are conceptual difficulties in this theory as to
both the nature of nature and the normative consequences to
be drawn from that which is found natural. Is nature physical
nature in general, or is it man's biological nature? And, then,
is that which is found natural in either of these models to be
held as the' paradigm of order from which ethical imperatives
must be deduced, or to be held as limitations upon man's
capability within which he must build his normative structure?
plicable, excluding atheists from its scope. The U.S.S.R. reminded that the question of
the divine origin of man was debated in Paris in 1789 and the Declaration then
adopted did not contain any allusion to this question. Belgium responded that the
American Declaration of Independence contained the words "endowed by their
Creator" and found it inconceivable that the Third Committee could resolve the ques-
tion by a vote. France felt that way, too. Byelorussia, France, the Ukraine, India, the
United Kingdom, and Chile opposed the amendment because of its controversial
nature. Finally, the Netherlands chose not to insist that it be put to vote. Proceedings
of the Third Committee, 754-78, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR 64-66 (1948). See also A. VER-
DOODT, supra note 10, at 275-81.
72 It is interesting to note that while Hegel admitted a concept of rights, he turn-
ed Locke's theory upside down by maintaining that rights belonged to societies or com-
munities, not individuals. The Declaration of Rights proclaimed by the nationalist
German liberals in 1848 followed the Hegelian concept by speaking of the rights of the
German people, not the rights of man as asserted by the American and French
Declarations following Locke. See M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 5
(1962).
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(6) Matters of norms are moral determinations or value
judgments. They cannot be made simply by observing either
the facts of nature in general or the facts of human nature."
Manmade moral evaluations are inserted into natural law en-
thymematically when that law is set up as a major premise
from which are de'rived the conclusions about normative im-
peratives. When natural law produces moral imperatives, it is
because premises for those imperatives have already been infus-
ed into it.
(7) This theory ascribes to that which is natural the
characteristics of being innate, universal, and immutable.7
4
Now, that which is perceived natural has often proceeded on
conflicting interpretations. For example, Locke regards man in
his natural state as someone seeking the good of others as well
as his own and derives his theory of government from that
perception, whereas Hobbes finds men in the state of nature at
each other's throat and derives his own theory of government
from that perception. Since both conceptions are claimed to be
innate, universal, and immutable, the choice between them has
to be made. The theory under discussion is not equipped to
cope with the problem of this choice. That choice is made
totally arbitrarily.
(8) Cultural anthropology has taught us that human
nature, if it at all exists apart from culture, has manifested
itself in different cultural patterns. There are different ways of
life in the world. A theory which proceeds from universal, im-
mutable, a priori postulates must either ignore the plurality of
cultural manifestations of human nature, or dismiss those
" Cf. Sinha, The Fission and Fusion of Is-Ought in Legal Philosophy, 21 VILL.
L. REV. 839 (1976).
74 In the recently discovered ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE (W. von Leydon
ed. 1954), Locke argues that since scientific study of the universe has shown that laws
operate throughout nature, it follows that these must be laws governing human con-
duct, and since laws are universally operative it follows that natural law exists.
However, his argument lacks persuasion. There is an essential difference between
scientific laws and moral laws. A scientific law states an Observed regularity in nature.
Therefore it is predictive, not something that can be obeyed or disobeyed at will. If oc-
currences contrary to it happen, it ceases to be law. On the other hand, a moral law
or a law of human, conduct can be obeyed or not, and it does not cease to exist upon




manifestations. as aberrations to the extent they are discordant
with these a priori postulates. This is hardly a satisfactory way
of going about achieving human rights or justice for the in-
dividual who does, in fact, live in his particular culture. For
the procedure which this approach follows is either the ignor-
ing of his culture or the dismissing of it as an aberration.
(9) The natural law theory of human rights under ex-
amination distorts the historicity of man and his human rights
discussed earlier. Since these rights are considered innate in
nature under this theory, their historicity becomes merely a
progressive manifestation, evolution, or unfolding of that in-
nate essence which was intrinsically present at the outset of the
historical process. The formal structure of this process is pro-
vided by the historical time, and the law of its manifestation is
provided by a principle of necessity in history. Since the essence
itself is the ordering of its manifestation this internal structure
of essence must of necessity be reproduced in the structure of
historical time. This kind of approach to human rights has
dangerous consequences. First, it breeds a deterministic ac-
count of history, ignoring its contingent aspects, and puts a
fatalistic damper on any effort today of doing something about
the realization of human rights. Second, it breeds the assump-
tion of autonomy of the developmental process of human rights
which is determined only by i ts internal law, whereas the facts
of history glare into our face, screaming that human rights,
both in the emergence of the norm and in the specification of
the norm, have been conditioned by the social relations and
the institutional forms of these relations which have existed
from time to time. These rights exist not in the absolute in-
dependence of historicity, but in the context of historical times
which, in today's context, would include the state forms of
social organization, the impersonality of industrialization, the
particular technology available in our time, the particular
welfare expectations from the state that exist in the individual,
the particular kinds of needs that are experienced by the in-
dividual, and so on. These conditions are not merely non-.
causative incidentals which provide a stage for the unfolding of
an autonomous system of human rights. Rather, they are con-
ditions which participate in producing not only the norm but
the specific catalog of such rights as well. This is not to suggest
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
that human rights at various historical times have no universal
connection at all. The limits of this paper do not permit an ex-
cursion into the historiography of human rights.75 However, my
contention here is that it is a mistake to look at that history as
an unfolding of an autonomous system.
(10) It is not necessary for human rights to have a
metaethics. The natural law theories of human rights have
both metaethical and normative components which are inex-
tricably intertwined 'under these theories. That is to say, they
ontologically describe moral concepts in the metaethical com-
ponent, they prescribe modes of conduct in the normative com-
ponent, and they maintain that the former is necessary for the
latter. However, I do not see any logical necessity between the
two.7 6 It is quite possible to accept norms without accepting
their metaethical description. It is also possible to develop
significant conditions of human rights claims77 without having
to resort to metaethics.7 s This, of course, does not mean that a
"simpl[e] . . . straightforward pragmatic justification or vin-
dication"7 9 is enough, or that there is no need for a theory
justifying human rights. However, it is possible to separate the
metaethical from the normative.
B. The Being of Man as Man
Human rights are sometimes justified on the basis of the fact that
man is man. It is said that each individual shares in the law of nature
71 One fascinating thesis is that this history is to be explained neither in terms of
the evolution of an essence nor the concatenation of constituent moments, but in terms
of the anticipatory action of a telos. See Ladrire, Human Rights and Historicity, 10
WORLD JUSTICE 147 (1968-69).
716 Cf Frankena's statement that "it would be substantially correct to say that the
concept of human rights is the doctrine of natural rights without its metaethics."
Frankena, The Concept of Universal Human Rights, in 1 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL A. (E.
Div.), SCIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 189, 192-93 (1952). See also in this
connection, the problems raised by Macdonald, Natural Rights, 47 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 225 (1946-47), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (A. Melden ed.
1970).
" As suggested in Melden, The Concept of Universal Human Rights, in 1 AM.
PHILOSOPHICAL A. (E. Div.), SCIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1952);
Golding, Towards a Theory of Human Rights, 52 MONIST 521 (1968).
78 On a debate on whether human rights are metaethically neutral, compare
Machan, supra note 70, with Blackstone, Equality and Human Rights, 52 MONIST 616
(1968).
11 Advanced, for example, by Blackstone, supra note 78, at 631.
[Vol. 10:469
ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY
just because he is a human being, 80 that human rights are owed to
man because of the very fact that he is man,8' that human rights arise
because man has rationality and capability of free choice. 82
There are difficulties in accepting this theory as a basis for human
rights. To begin with, if it is a re-invocation of the natural law theory,
discussed above, it suffers from the shortcomings of that theory.
Moreover, a human being is not a natural being. He is part of nature
only to the extent that he is actual to himself, but he does not regard
himself as identical with his natural being, so that his being waits on
him to give it meaning. Since he is not a natural being, he cannot con-
stitute that which is natural, from which natural law theory derives its
imperatives for human conduct. Furthermore, human nature is not a
specific quality or a set of qualities which all men possess. Rather, it is
simply a potentiality for a certain range of qualities and activities given
to him by his potentiality for reasoning and his perceptual apparatus.
From the fact that he has this range of qualities and activities, and not
the qualities themselves, nothing that is normative, such as human
rights, follows. Again, anthropological learning has alerted us to the
fact that there are too many variations in particular norms in different
societies of men, so that the possibility of deriving any workable
norms from man's animal nature becomes a very unpromising pro-
position.8 3 Finally, the suggestion that human rights arise because man
has rationality and capability of free choice seems to indicate that the
essence of man is self-determination or having the course of his life in
his own hands. However, this is an ideal or a morally preferable way of
life in some cultures, 8 4 but not the empirical essence of man. From the
80 H. GROTIUS, 1 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, LIBRI TRES 1, 4 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925).
81 The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a
person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and which consequently is
not merely a means to an end, but an end, an end which must be treated as
such. The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it
does not signify that by virtue of natural law, the human person has the right
to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights. These are things
which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is man.
J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 65 (D. Anson trans. 1943).
'2 Machan, supra note 38, at 227-32; Machan, supra note 70, at 33-35.
Is See S. BENN & R. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES 0F POLITICAL THOUGHT (1965);
Nielsen, On Taking Human Nature as the Basis of Morality-An Exercise in
Linguistic Analysis, 29 Soc. RESEARCH 157 (1962).
84 Reinhardt quotes a Moslem proverb in this context which says: "A man who
has a bad destiny is lucky; he needs only to be thankful. But a man who has a good
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fact of being man it does not follow that it is human to determine the
course of your own life and inhuman not to do so." No moral im-
peratives follow from the being of man as man; consequently, human
rights cannot be based upon that mere fact.
C. The Equality of Man
Claims about equality can be both prescriptive and descriptive.
The prescriptive claim is used when it is argued that equality should
be one of the specific human rights. But it is in the descriptive claim
that it is argued that equality is that factual characteristic which all
men have in common, and which, consequently, constitutes the basis
for human rights. The human worth of all persons, as distinguished
from their merit, 8 6 is claimed to be equal. It continues to be equal
even though their merit is unequal. Well-being and freedom are uni-
que and unrepeatable aspects of the individual's existence, it is argued,
and they are worth the same to each one. Where individuals are
capable of enjoying the same goods, the intrinsic value of their enjoy-
ment is the same, so that one man's well-being, as well as his freedom,
is as valuable as any other's. This equal worth of happiness and
freedom is, therefore, suggested as the foundation for human rights.6 7
destiny is unlucky, for he may think he has had something to do with it." Reinhardt,
Comments on Professor Machan's Address, 52 PERSONALIST 346, 348 (1971).
" As Kamenka puts it, "There is nothing to show logically, without moral
assumptions, that it is 'human' to act and 'inhuman' to be acted upon or even to be
treated as means or object; it is not 'contrary to human nature' to make oneself a beast
of burden, an object of pleasure or part of the rat-race. Men and women have done so
for many generations; to say that in doing so they have behaved as though they were
not human is to load the term 'human' with a moral content that cannot be deduced
from its empirical denotation." E. KAMENKA, MARXISM AND ETHICS 26-27 (1969).
Reinhardt gives an example of the slave of willing consent to highlight the point. He
points out that "[o]ne might say of the slave of willing consent that he ceased to 'be a
man.' But this use of 'be a man' is dependent on its use in the imperative 'Be a manl,'
and that imperative is patently expressive of an ideal. Moreover you cannot address
such an imperative to anything other than what obviously is a man already." Rein-
hardt, supra note 84, at 350.
86 Merit in this argument means "all the kinds of valuable qualities or perfor-
mances in respect of which persons may be graded," provided only they are "ac-
quired," i.e., represent what their possessor has himself made of his natural en-
dowments and environmental opportunities. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL'
JUSTICE 31, 43 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
87 Id. See also Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,
61 J. PHILOSOPHY 628 (1964).
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The first difficulty with this thesis is the question whether each
person's intrinsic value of his well-being and freedom is indeed the
same as, or equal to, any other's. An answer proposed to this criticism
is that since the denial of the opportunity to experience the enjoyment
of goods enjoyable by all results in denial of a full and satisfying life, it
must be the case that their intrinsic values are equal for all human be-
ings."6 While I do feel that there is something objectionable about de-
nying an individual the enjoyment of these goods, I fail to see how
that fact shows that their instrinic values are equal for all persons.
Secondly, the alternative suggested by the proponents of this theory is
not satisfactory either. It is suggested that, conceding differences in
these values, these differences are not discoverable or measurable and,
therefore, this impossibility of determining differences is a good basis
for human rights.8 9 This argument appeals to us to opt for equality.
But, then, this becomes merely an article of faith or an intuitive
preference for the egalitarian morality as opposed, for example, to
Nietzsche's master morality. 0 My preference for one of the alternative
moral codes does not prove that it is superior to others.9 '
D. Social Utility
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder of the utilitarian
philosophy, said that "[n]ature has placed man under the empire of
pleasure and pain," and that "[t]he principle of utility subjects
everything to these two motives." 92 Utility expresses "the property or
tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or to procure some good" and
"[t]hat which is conformable to the utility or the interest of an in-
dividual is what tends to augment the total sum of his happiness. That
which is conformable to the utility or the interests of a community is
what tends to augment the total sum of the happiness of the in-
dividuals that compose it."9 While Bentham scoffed at justice and
similar notions, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) attempted a synthesis be-
tween justice and utility through a sentiment of justice or the in-
dividual feeling of right, "[j]ust persons resenting a hurt to society,
88 Wasserstrom, supra note 87, at 637-38.
89 Id.
90 F. NIETZSCHE, JENSEITS VON GUT BOSE (1886) (trans. by W. Kaufman as
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, esp. 202 ff. (1966)).
91 For an elaboration of this criticism, see Nielsen, Scepticism and Human
Rights, 52 MONIST 573 (1968).
92 J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 2 (C. Ogden ed. 1930).
93 Id.
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though not otherwise a hurt to themselves, however painful, unless it
be of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the
repression of." 94
Social utility has sometimes been suggested as the basis for human
rights, so that genuine human rights are those which would increase
total happiness or well-being. 95
Difficulties exist in accepting social utility as the basis for human
rights. For one thing, it is a delusion to think that there is a necessary
identity between individual happiness and communal happiness.9 6
That delusion oversimplifies the problem of human rights by
generating the belief that what augments the happiness of the in-
dividuals composing a community is necessarily in the interest of that
community. In fact, the very struggle of human rights, to the extent it
consists of securing the protection of the individual from excesses of
the state, is rooted in the perception by the state that its interests are
being threatened by the individual's efforts to maximize his happiness.
Secondly, social utility may sometimes be in outright conflict with
human rights. It is not hard to imagine cases when the welfare of the
whole may be promoted by the sacrifice of a single group, e.g., Ger-
man Jews or American Indians. This is precisely the kind of social
solution against which the human rights movement is directed. Third-
ly, the thrust of human rights is to achieve justice for the individual.
Justice is not merely a function of the maximization of the welfare of
the whole. It is a matter of how the goods and the ills of that whole
are distributed among the individual members of that whole. Finally,
there are the familiar problems of differing conceptions as to what
precisely and specifically constitutes utility with respect to certain
goods or value, the difficulty of measuring utility, indeed the very
measurability of it, and the uncertainty of the evidentiary basis for any
claim that something is a condition of utility.
I have examined the various theories which have primarily been
advanced as a basis for human rights. They have included natural law,
94 J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANIsM 64 (Everyman's ed. 1951) (lst ed. 1863).
91 For example, Blake maintains that "the truly natural rights must be those
claims, liberties, and privileges the possession of which by the person or persons in
question will continue, so long at least as human nature and the laws of the physical
universe remain substantially what they now are, to constitute permanent and general
conditions of human happiness." Blake, On Natural Rights, 36 ETHICs 86, 94 (1925).
96 The late Professor Friedmann has shown that this delusion is reflected in some




the being of man as man, the equality of man, and social utility. In
the following section, I shall outline the anthropocentric theory of in-
ternational law and suggest that theory as a basis for human
rights.
IV. THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
If international law is to maximize its relevance to human affairs
or, more explicitly, if it is to play its role in the twin goals of
law-providing order and achieving values in the universe in which it
operates-it must take on the anthropocentric perspective. Suddenly in
recent years, human beings have been catapulted from the state to the
entire planet in a very immediate sense, even in such matters as air to
breathe, food to eat, and so on. The task of international law, conse-
quently, has become the management of human existence on a
planetary scale, no longer limited to its traditional role of providing
binding rules for governing relations among states. Therefore, interna-
tional law and its institutions must now be approached from an an-
thropocentric point of view.
When we approach the problem in this manner, we are quite ob-
viously looking into the future, and not merely analyzing the data of
the past. Recent futurology has addressed itself to the problem of
future international legal order. Our attempt here is to avoid the
futurological method. That method has, generally speaking, proceeded
along three major lines: extrapolation, analogy, and prophecy. The
difficulty with extrapolation of present trends is that the trends are
changing and, therefore, are of limited assistance in guiding the
future. Analogy proceeds on the basis that something has happened
previously so it will happen again, usually in single instances. Analogy
becomes of limited value, first, because it usually proceeds from single
instances and does not adequately comprehend the dynamics of the
whole and, secondly, because it is too tied down to that which has
happened in the past. Prophecy proceeds from the belief that certain
things will happen anyway and, to a large extent, it has been self-
fulfilling. So, we have chosen here to avoid the futurological method,
and instead, to follow the philosophical, eidetic, and transcendental
reductions to which recent phenomenology97 has been driving our at-
9' Johann Heinrich Lambert first spoke of phenomenology as the theory of illu-
sion. J. LAMBERT, NEUES ORGANON (1764). Lambert's contemporary Immanuel Kant
termed "phenomena" those objects and events that appear in our experience, as
distinguished from "noumena," which are objects and events as they are in themselves,
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tention. Philosophical reduction is achieved by bypassing all theories
and explanatory concepts about things, thereby returning to the things
themselves. Eidetic reduction is achieved by eliminating the factual
elements of the objects under investigation so as to perceive their
essence (eidos), through discerning their typical structure. Transcen-
dental reduction is achieved by eliminating other objects of con-
sciousness to disclose the thing's consciousness, or intentionality, thereby
enabling the consciousness to perceive itself in pure transcendental
ego.
Within the limits of the space available here, we cannot carry out
a detailed application of our preferred method to the objects of our in-
quiry. However, let us briefly observe three major objects of our in-
terest: man, international law, and the state.
beyond the forms imposed upon them by our cognitive faculties. Kant argued that
man can know only phenomena, not noumena. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
(1781). This theory was disputed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. G. HEGEL,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT (1807). In the mid-nineteenth century,
phenomenology denoted a purely descriptive study of any given subject matter. See W.
HAMILTON, LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS (1858); E. VON HARTMANN, PHENOMENOLOGY
OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1878). At the turn of the century, C.S. Pierce extended
phenomenology beyond a descriptive study of all that is observed to be real, to include
whatever is before the mind, whether it be real, illusory, imaginary, or dreamy. Ed-
mund Husserl, who is regarded as the father of modem phenomenology, used the term
in the early years of this century to denote a manner of approaching philosophy. E.
HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (1960);
IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (1931); IDEEN ZU EINEN
REINEN PHANOMENOLOGISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, VOL. I: PHANOMENOLOGISCHE UNTER-
SUCHUNGEN ZUR KONSTITUTION; VOL. III: DIE PHANOMENOLOGIE UND DIE FUN-
DAMENTS DER WISSENSCHAFTEN (M. Biemel ed. 1952); THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN
SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (1970); THE IDEA OF
PHENOMENOLOGY (1964); THE PARIS LECTURES (1964); Phenomenology, in EN-
CYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed. 1927) (new translation by R. Palmer in 2 J. BRIT.
SOCY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 77 (1971)). Thus, in the modern parlance of philosophy,
phenomenology has become a philosophical method. It indicates two things: (a) a par-
ticular method of observation outlined by Husserl; and (b) the development of certain
doctrinal themes, or the drawing of ontological, metaphysical, and anthropological
consequences by different phenomenologists, including Husserl. P. AMSELEK,
MRTHODE PHPNOMPNOLGIQUE ET THPORIE DU DROIT 86 (1964); E. BREHIER, HISTORIE
DE LA PHILOSOPHIE ALLAMANDE 182 (3d ed. 1954); H. POS, PROBLUMS ACTUELS DE LA
PHNOMNOLOGIE: ACTES DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE PHtNOMENOLOGIE 31
(1951). Phenomenology appears in a variety of ways. It may appear as an objective in-
quiry into the logic of essences and meanings, as a theory of abstraction, as a
psychological description of consciousness, as a speculation on the transcedental ego, as




It used to be that man lived in a state rather than on the planet,
in the sense that the problem of the satisfaction of his needs, such as
breathing air, eating food, drinking water, procreating, protecting his
life from crime, disease, starvation, improving his economic condition,
and his cultural enrichment, protecting his intangible values of
freedoms and liberties, and so on, used to be confined to his state.
Now he has been catapulted from his state to the entire planet for his
existence in an unprecedented way. Thus, a massive deforestation, say,
in Africa, tends to affect the oxygen content of the air that everyone
breathes. The international aspects of his food are only too obvious to
be pointed out. His procreative activity is of international concern in
the control and redistribution of population. Protection of his life from
crime, disease, starvation, industrial pollution, and the like are inter-
national matters, as is the protection of his life from war. His
economic betterment is a matter of international trade, international
exploitation and distribution of resources, development of technology
and its transfer globally, and so on. Conditions of his work, leisure,
and participation in cultural enrichment are international matters.
And so are the fulfillment of his intangible values of freedoms, liber-
ties, and the like. From the viewpoint of defining the task for inter-
national law and, therefore, the directions in which its subject matter
must continue to grow, the anthropocentric needs of planetary ex-




survery of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, see
P. THf.VANEZ, WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY? AND OTHER ESSAYS 37-92 (1961). Several
kinds of phenomenology are evident in the work of Husserl himself. See 1 H.
SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
74-75 (2d ed. 1965). However, the conceptual unity of this philosophical movement
results from its method. R. CALLOIS, PANORAMA DES IDEES CONTEMPORAINES 55 (1951);
1 M. NATANSON, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, in PHENOMENOLOGY AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 23-24 (1973); Amselek, La phdnomdnologie et le droit, 17 AR-
CHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 185, 188 (1972) (trans. as The Phenomenological
Description of Law, in 2 M. NATANSON, supra, at 367. According to one observer,
the steps of the phenomenological method are: (1) investigating particular phenomena;
(2) investigating general essences; (3) apprehending essential relationships among
essences; (4) watching modes of appearing; (5) watching the constitution of
phenomena in consciousness; (6) suspending belief in the existence of the phenomena;
and (7) interpreting the meaning of phenomena. 2 H. SPIEGELBERG, supra, at 659.
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c. Water
d. Procreation (population control, population redistribution)





(v) Killers of modern life (transportation, industry)
2. Secondary needs:
a. Economic betterment (availability, exploitation, and mobil-
ity of resources; development of technology and its transfer)
b. Cultural enrichment (conditions of work, leisure, and par-
ticipation in cultural goods)
c. Achievement of intangible values (freedoms, liberties)
B. International Law
In Roman times, the Roman Custom, consuetudo communis, ap-
plied throughout the world known to Europe. In the Middle Ages, the
emperor gave law to the entire world, the universus orbis, and not
merely to the occident. With the decline of the emperor's position as
the universal lawgiver, particularly from the 12th century onward,
rulers began claiming exemption from his authority on legal grounds,
such as prescription, ancient custom, privilege granted by the
emperor, and even assumption of irregular titles. Such was the spirit of
the times in which Bartole wrote that "civitates non recognoscunt
superiorem" (states do not recognize a higher authority than their
own), and Balde declared that "rex in regno suo est imperator regni"
(the king, in his kingdom, is emperor of that kingdom). In the wake of
imperial disintegration, a feudal system of authority emerged in
Europe. There appeared a world of warrior, priest, free farmer, serf,
and local trader. By the 17th century, Western man, who had coloniz-
ed the new world and moved eastward in quest of further trade, look-
ed for a new system of authority to control the rich life of this trade
and intercourse and found it in the nation-state. At first, the warrior
chief had been the sovereign, but the modern state replaced him.
Sovereign and impersonal, the state was separate from its prince,
separate even from its government. It was a juridical entity by itself.
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, ending the Thirty Years' War,
marked the final step in the emergence of the modern system which
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carved the world into separate states. Civil law and the law of nature
gave these states their juridical foundation; the law of nations gave
them the governing principle for relations among themselves. This law,
called the law of nations until Jeremy Bentham called it international
law in 1789, was carved out of civil law and appeared applicable to in-
terstate relations alone. It was, thus, newly conceived. Then its content
had to be developed. After some early flirtations with natural law, it
came to be settled that the source of international law was positivist,
that this law was valid if it conformed to the actual practice of states,
that it was the common consent of the sovereign states that provided
its validity. This law, then, delivered the rules regulating interstate
relations.
The traditional model of international law has been inadequate for
providing the necessary means of control for the social action of world
society even under the conditions of the world of 1648, since, although
the structure of the world under its system was compartmentalized into
independent, sovereign states, the social action of the world could not
be so compartmentalized even then. This is more so now, when the in-
creased international interdependence and intercourse have broken
down the bounds which had confined international law essentially to
the regulation of relations among states. International law has grown
in this century into those dimensions which Judge Philip Jessup cap-
tured under the caption of transnational law and which Professor
Wolfgang Friedmann rationalized by distinguishing the traditional,
essentially "horizontal" international law of coexistence from the
newer, "vertical" international law of cooperation. And now, with
man's existence broken out of the state and catapulted upon the planet
the direction is set for an international law of planetary existence. An
examination of the existing international law and institutions would in-
dicate a movement of international law already in that direction.
C. The State
In recent times, a number of states have sprouted like mushrooms.
The proliferation of states is demonstrated in the following table,
adapted from an earlier work: 98
98 S.P. SINHA, supra note 46, at 25.
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EMERGENCE OF THE STATES OF ASIA AND AFRICA ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
Number of
Number of Asian-African Percentage of
participating states Asian-African
Year Occasion states participating states
1885 Congo Conference of
Berlin 14 0 0
1899 First Hague Conference 27 5 19
1907 Second Hague Conference 43 5 12
1920 Formation of the League
of Nations 45 6 13
1945 Establishment of the
United Nations 51 11 22
1978 Roster of the United
Nations 149 91 61
Not only have the states grown in number, but they are engaged also
in an intensive pursuit of concentrating military, political, and
economic power in their hands. There is no evidence of either the
withering away of the national state or its displacement through the
transfer of major decision-making powers from the national to the in-
ternational level. States, large and small, have amply demonstrated
their propensity to guard their nationalistic model most fanatically.
Looking at man, international law, and the state in this fashion,
we come to the conclusion that the anthropocentric needs of existence
in the transformed relationship of man to the world beyond his state
have to be met to a crucial extent on the international level. And, yet,
the structure of organization for this task cannot be through transfer-
ring major decision-making powers from national states to interna-
tional bodies. Dreams about an international confederation of all
states, or the like, are simply unrealistic. The only feasible approach is
for international law to take what has been described as the func-
tionalist approach, 99 thereby bypassing the national state, rather than
attempting to overcome it, through organizing internationally the
achievement of certain specific values or the fulfillment of certain
specific needs.
The anthropocentric theory of international law, therefore, calls
for a functionalist approach for that law and its institutions in the
fulfillment of the needs of man's planetary existence. The response of




this law to that calling would determine the issue of its relevance or
desuetude to human affairs in the near future.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS LOCATED IN THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY
This article seeks the basis as well as justification for the interna-
tional movement for human rights in the anthropocentric theory of in-
ternational law outlined above. In light of that theory, the human
rights imperative'"° becomes the fulfillment of man's needs of his
planetary existence with justice. This, at once, provides us with the
badly needed separation, though not dichotomy, of the concept from
the catalog of human rights. The social world is a pluralistic
phenomenon. Different social systems, with their own economic,
cultural, and ideological particularity, have different ways of going
about achieving the satisfaction of the needs of those who compose
their membership. The task of the human rights movement is to see
that within the context of these differing systems, that is to say, within
these economic, cultural, and ideological particularities, the human
rights imperative -justice in fulfillment of man's needs-is satisfied.
This, then, would enable us to develop particular catalogs of specific
human rights for different social systems. It may be more likely than
not, that certain specific rights in these particular catalogs may be
similar, or even universal, but then that would be a consequence of
the application of the human rights imperative to the different social
systems and not, very significantly, an instance of the catalog of one
particular society being rammed down the throat of another under the
crusading rubric of human rights. It is self-defeating for the human
rights movement to take the latter approach and to force American-
styled private property upon the Soviet Union or China, or to abolish
arranged marriages in Daryabad, India. The present frustrations of
the human rights movement are in part due to the confusion of the
concept and the catalog.
Not all the battles for human rights will be won merely by adopt-
ing the approach suggested in this article, but the human rights move-
ment would, at least, become intellectually sound thereby. This theory
of human rights grounds the justification for these rights in necessity,
not in pious exhortations, and provides for both the positive and
negative aspects of human rights or, in other words, both the protec-
tion of the individual and the fulfillment of his needs. It also comports
with the historicity of man, allows an order of priority in the fulfill-
100 Reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative, but much less dogmatic.
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ment of the needs at hand, 10 ' provides for revisability of these rights,
accommodates cultural relativity, is compatible with ideological rela-
tivity, and is consonant with variability in economic ability and tech-
nological capability.
This theory, consequently, avoids the major pitfalls of the other
theories as a basis for human rights discussed earlier. Since its tenets
issue from the needs of man, it need not rely, as does natural law, on
an arbitrary insulation from the possibility of verification. The needs
of man are a verifiable fact. Again, it does not depend upon beliefs
which are not, in fact, generally held by all peoples, since
its basis is the needs which, in fact, are generally experienced by man.
Nor does it invoke faith for its criterion of truth. Moreover, its claims
are open to scrutiny by empirically grounded questions. It does not fall
prey to inscrutable notions, such as nature. Unlike natural law
theories, it does provide a principle for choosing one particular claim
of a human right over another. Furthermore, it puts the responsibility
for moral choices squarely upon those who make those choices, rather
than diffusing that responsibility into nature. Similarly, the theory sug-
gested here avoids the difficulties which beset justifying human rights
on the being of man as man. It does not reduce the human being to a
natural being. Nor does it derive the normative from something as
non-normative as the fact of nature. It does not make arbitrary
assumptions about the variety of moral preferences which exist in dif-
ferent cultures. Again, the theory argued here avoids the problems at-
tendant upon taking the equal worth of man as a basis for human
rights. It is not necessary under our theory to either determine or
assume an equality of the intrinsic worth of goods for all persons, both
of which are dubious propositions. Finally, the theory proposed here
also avoids the pitfalls of utilitarianism as a basis for human rights. It
does not accept the utilitarian delusion that individual happiness is
identical to communal happiness. Nor does it have to overlook the fact
that social utility sometimes may collide outright with human rights.
For its imperative is the fulfillment of the needs of man with justice.
101 For example, in the Bangladesh catalog of human rights, food is inarguably
prior to freedom of taking trips (travel and movement) to enjoy the natural beauty of
the landscape from one end of the country to another, whereas in the United States
catalog the prior position of food to stave off starvation would not be the same; and
the total abolition of the two rights would be repugnant to both of these catalogs. The
separation of concept from catalog under the theory proposed here would preserve this
sense of priority.
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